Series
Government proposes amends to UK competition regime: What you need to know
Government proposes amends to UK competition regime: What you need to know
20 January 2026
Series
20 January 2026
The UK Government has announced a package of proposed “refinements” to the competition regime. The package builds on the “comprehensive programme of work” that the CMA has undertaken over the past year to align with the Government’s growth strategy and last year’s strategic steer calling for the CMA to be “swift, predictable, independent and proportionate”.
The proposals cover: 1) the decision-making process for Phase II mergers and markets decisions; 2) merger jurisdiction and procedural rules; 3) the markets regime and remedies process; as well as 4) a range of miscellaneous reforms.
While the proposed reforms are significant, many are not entirely new. Some give a statutory footing to changes already made within the CMA over the last year while on decision-making and political accountability, other reforms import aspects of the digital markets processes into the CMA's mainstream work.
The package reflects the output of a significant consultation that has already occurred with a range of stakeholders. While there will doubtless be further debate and refinement as the legislative process unfolds, the Government has committed to bring forward legislation as soon as Parliamentary time allows, to ensure businesses benefit from the promised enhanced predictability as soon as possible.
This post summarises the key proposed changes, and what they mean for businesses engaging with the CMA now, and if and when, they become law.
The end of an era: abolishing the CMA's independent panel system
The most significant reform is the abolition of the CMA's independent panel system for Phase II merger and markets decisions. The consultation acknowledges the challenge that senior leaders at the CMA (accountable to Parliament for the CMA’s performance) are legally prevented from being involved in (and ensuring consistency across) the most crucial decisions, due to the fact Phase II decisions are taken by “independent” panels. Under the new structure, Phase II determinations will be made by a sub-committee of the CMA Board, mirroring the Digital Markets Board Committee model already in place for the UK's digital markets competition regime. These sub-committees will include non-staff “experts” in addition to senior CMA staff.
The panel system—a legacy from when the Competition Commission (and before then, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission) handled Phase II investigations — has previously come under fire for creating uncertainty and potential inconsistency in CMA’s policy and approach. The Government's action plan in 2025 acknowledged that it is no longer working well and, to that extent, this proposal – while significant – is not a surprise.
This shift consolidates decision-making authority within the CMA itself, while giving more direct accountability for the CMA Board on all merger outcomes (the consultation insists this is while preserving independence). In practice, it will concentrate significantly more power in the CMA executive. Managing bandwidth of key senior stakeholders (in particular the CEO) will be a key challenge, on which we expect there to be significant feedback in the consultation. However, helpfully, the consultation also makes clear that day-to-day investigation decisions will fall to the case team. These currently fall to the (Panel-led) Inquiry Group, which can negatively impact pace, and so will be a welcome process improvement.
Many have argued that a change to the decision-making system, which removes the checks and balances from an independent panel, should be paired with (i) a change to the standard on appeal for mergers (and markets) – raising from judicial review to merits – and (ii) opening access to file in in-depth mergers as is the case at EC level. In this regard it is interesting what is not included in the package. There is no mention of access to file, and the Government appears wedded to retaining the judicial review standard (noting that this ensures a robust testing of evidence base and evaluation, while “minimising the time, costs and uncertainty that can be associated with other standards of review”). We anticipate this will be hotly debated in the consultation responses.
| What this means in practice: The CMA Board will now have direct responsibility for Phase II outcomes, creating a more streamlined decision-making process - but potentially raising questions about the independence of the regime and the implications of the consolidation of power (practical and otherwise). Meanwhile, handing procedural decisions (e.g. over deadline extensions) to case teams should ease some of the frictions that can arise in Phase II processes. |
Narrowing the CMA's merger jurisdiction: legislative limits on share of supply and material influence
The CMA has one of the broadest merger jurisdictions of any authority globally, with few legislative limiting principles. While the CMA's revised guidance on jurisdiction and procedure (October 2025) offers some additional clarity on jurisdictional concepts, legislative reform to curtail ambiguity has been widely anticipated.
In order to increase business certainty, the Government is proposing to introduce exhaustive (rather than illustrative) criteria for each of the share of supply and material influence tests, as follows:
These proposals – consistent with the direction of travel over the last 18 months and the recently amended guidance on jurisdiction and procedure mentioned above are overall much more modest than the brightline test / quasi-mandatory notification regime used in other jurisdictions. The proposed closed lists remain broad and the CMA retains significant discretion. But they nonetheless represent a deliberate policy choice to prioritise certainty over the CMA's ability to catch all potentially harmful deals that fall outside traditional parameters.
| What this means in practice: A move which in principle should mean that businesses have greater clarity on whether their transactions fall within the CMA's jurisdiction, but we anticipate will have limited impact in practice given the continued breadth of the proposed definitions and changes already made by the CMA to its own guidance. |
Simplification of the markets regime
The Government is proposing to merge market studies with market investigations, to create a single process that must be completed within 24 months, including implementation of remedies (extendable by a maximum of 6 months, in certain circumstances).
This represents a significant truncation of what has historically been a lengthy process (albeit not as significant a change as the headline put out suggests, which implies that most reviews will take only 6-12 months). Given the current regime allows for 3+ years of formal investigation, this change is welcome, but there are questions about whether the CMA will be able to deliver big remedies (such as those delivered with Open Banking) within this compressed timeframe. These changes build more flexibility into a markets regime, which was already made more flexible under the DMCC. Precisely how this will work in practice is yet to be seen.
Substantively, the Government proposes replacing the current dual-test approach (adverse effect on consumers for market studies; adverse effect on competition for market investigations) with a single "adverse effect on consumers" test throughout the streamlined market review process. In our view, the practical impact of this refinement is unlikely to be significant, with the remit now, in principle, capturing e.g. issues around fairness and trust in markets that might not meet conventional competition law thresholds.
Additional markets reforms include:
| What this means in practice: Businesses subject to markets reviews should see faster resolution; though the compressed timelines may result in additional pressure on both the CMA and parties to land quickly on appropriate remedies in complex cases. |
Secretary of State approval for CMA guidance: a new political check
The Secretary of State will be given a veto power over a “wider range” of key CMA guidance documents. Presently, the Secretary of State only has a say over CMA guidance perceived to be novel or of increased sensitivity (specifically, the digital markets regime, civil penalties and international cooperation). It will be interesting to see how the “wider range” of guidance is scoped going forward - but the Merger Assessment Guidelines are specifically mentioned.
This gives another formal lever of Government accountability, to “ensure guidance accurately reflects legislative intent”. However, given the significant raft of refreshed guidance recently published by the CMA, including jurisdiction and procedure guidance in October 2025, new merger remedies guidance in December 2025, the practical effect of this change may take some time to be felt. The CMA’s open consultation on merger efficiencies could be one key test case.
| What this means in practice: While the CMA will retain day-to-day independence, the Government will have influence over how the CMA articulates its approach in guidance. |
Other notable reforms
The package includes several additional changes:
These reforms do not exist in isolation but rather represent a continuation of the recalibration of the UK competition regime to enhance predictability for business and ultimately support economic growth.
The consultation was issued on 20 January 2026 with responses to be submitted by 31 March 2026. The Government has committed to bringing forward legislation as soon as Parliamentary time allows; but of course, this consultation and the subsequent Parliamentary process will generate further debate.
This debate is likely to include what is not covered by these proposals – notably the appeal standard for merger and markets cases. In addition, the document recognises there are “common themes” between the CMA consultation and DBT’s review of the competition class action regime (but the latter will be subject to a separate consultation).
In the meantime, the proposed reforms reflect current thinking on the continued evolution and “refinement” of the UK competition regime. Whether or not all proposals ultimately make it into legislation, they are doubtless already important context for any business engaging with the CMA as the legislative process unfolds.
Authors:
Verity Egerton-Doyle, Jonathan Ford, Helen Crossley, Aoife Monaghan, Rachel Malloch, Elisha Kemp, Tara Rudra