Publication
Sony secures landmark win in PlayStation Store class action
November 2026
Publication
November 2026
On the 17 November 2026, the Competition Appeal Tribunal (‘CAT’) handed down its judgment in the class action brought against Sony Interactive Entertainment (‘SIE’) by Alex Neill Class Representative Limited (the ‘CR’). The CAT dismissed the CR’s claim on all grounds, rejecting its proposed market definitions, arguments on dominance and allegations of abuse.
In addition to being a resounding win for SIE, the judgment offers important guidance on the approach to market definition in the context of integrated systems, establishing exclusionary effects, assessing profitability within platform businesses, and the continuing relevance of the refusal to supply doctrine in digital markets. In this post, we consider the CAT’s findings and what they mean for future public and private antitrust enforcement.
The CR alleged that SIE held and abused a dominant position with respect to the PlayStation system by (i) requiring digital PlayStation content to be distributed through the PlayStation Store (‘PS Store’), and (ii) imposing excessive and unfair retail prices and distribution margins.
The claim was filed in August 2022, certified in November 2023 and tried over ten weeks between March and May 2026. The judgment dismisses the claim in its entirety. Although the CAT’s findings on market definition were such that it did not need to consider the rest of the claim in full, the CAT also explained why the abuse allegations would have failed even on the CR’s proposed markets.
The CR alleged that SIE occupied a dominant position in four distinct markets, namely (i) the 'console' market (which the CR argued comprised PlayStation and Xbox consoles only), (ii) the market for operating system software for PlayStation consoles, (iii) the market for the digital distribution of games for PlayStation consoles and (iv) the market for the digital distribution of add-on content for PlayStation consoles.
SIE responded that the CR's proposed markets were artificially narrow and excluded important sources of competition - including Nintendo devices, Valve's Steam Deck and gaming PCs at the hardware level, physical games and consumer multi-homing at the game distribution level, and consumer multi-homing and cross-commerce at the add-on content distribution level. Further, properly construed, SIE competed in a systems market, with competition between gaming devices and platforms disciplining pricing on their associated stores.
Starting with the CR’s proposed markets, the CAT applied the hypothetical monopolist framework: would a small but significant, non-transitory increase in price (‘SSNIP’) be profitable, taking account of users’ substitution options?
The alleged digital distribution markets (for both games and add-on content) were at the centre of the case, as the location of the allegedly abusive conduct. After careful consideration, the CAT rejected the CR's claim that there were distinct markets for the digital distribution of PlayStation content, finding that the PlayStation Store faced direct competition from:
Taken together, these constraints made the proposed PlayStation-only digital distribution markets an unsafe basis for assessing SIE’s conduct.
The CAT was also unpersuaded that a separate ‘console’ market could safely be limited to PlayStation and Xbox. SIE’s console prices were cross-subsidised by content revenues. Any application of the SSNIP test needed to address that subsidy, rather than simply start from observed hardware prices. There was no data or evidence before the CAT, however, that would enable it to reliably conduct such a test. As for the alleged operating-system software market, the CAT saw no sensible basis for separating the PlayStation operating-system software from the console. It noted that the CR had effectively abandoned this strand of its case by closing submissions.
The CAT then considered SIE’s argument that the relevant market was a systems market in which competition between systems constrained SIE’s pricing. The CAT noted that this question could be dealt with in the context of either market definition or dominance, but chose to address it at the market definition stage.
In doing so, the CAT noted the criteria outlined in Case T296/09 (European Federation of Ink and Ink Cartridge Manufacturers v European Commission), which it considered to be descriptive rather than representing a rigid test, noting that in this particular case the criteria might not comprehensively address all aspects of inter-system competition, in particular due to the prevalence of multihoming. It found all four criteria to be satisfied: Consumers could make informed comparisons of the lifetime costs of buying into the PlayStation system vs competing systems in circumstances where game prices were readily observable across platforms, even if that meant they were not able to predict every future purchase. Survey evidence showed those consumers were likely to take account of that information when choosing a console. The evidence further demonstrated that enough consumers would change their console choices in response to uncompetitive game prices to impose a meaningful constraint - and because console purchases continued throughout each generation, that constraint operated within a reasonable period, rather than only at the launch of a new console generation.
The CAT therefore considered that competition and rivalry at the system level provide an effective means to regulate pricing and competitive conduct in the aftermarket.
Having rejected the CR's proposed market definitions and found that the relevant market was a systems market (in respect of which the CR had not advanced any allegation of infringement), the CAT noted that the issue of dominance fell away. Nevertheless, it observed that - had it reached a different conclusion on market definition - the intense rivalry between operators of video gaming platforms, switching by consumers, influence held by publishers, and multi-homing by both consumers and publishers - as well as any out-of-market constraints - would mean that “the question of dominance was not clearly established, even on the [CR’s] own case”. In particular, the CAT noted that even in the CR’s alleged console market comprising just Xbox and PlayStation, it would “not be easily persuaded that [SIE was] dominant in that market.”
The CR alleged that SIE had engaged in three forms of exclusionary abuse: (i) tying of the PS Store to the console and/or system software, (ii) imposing an exclusive dealing obligation on publishers, and (iii) refusing to supply the systems and tools required to enable third parties to build competing stores that were compatible with the PlayStation system.
The CAT emphasised that the characterisation of an exclusionary practice as abusive depends on the exclusionary effects that that practice is capable of producing, and that those effects must be more than merely hypothetical. The burden of establishing these effects rested on the CR. On the evidence presented, the CAT was not persuaded that the exclusionary effects cited by the CR were more than merely hypothetical.
In reaching this conclusion, the CAT noted that:
SIE accepted that third-party stores were feasible in principle. But enabling them required changes to the existing PlayStation system, raised unresolved security concerns and presented performance issues that would require careful management. The CAT accepted that significant engineering effort and ongoing support would be needed in view of this.
The CR’s economic model assumed that competition between stores would lead to greater sales volumes, which would encourage publishers to reduce wholesale prices and enable retail prices to fall materially. The CAT found that account unconvincing. The assumptions made by the CR’s economic expert – Mr Harman – regarding the elasticity of demand were unsupported by evidence, and lower distribution commissions would not necessarily translate into lower consumer prices (as opposed to higher publisher margins).
In any event, Mr Harman had not credibly explained how rival stores would enter, gain market share and remain viable. The CAT noted in this regard that:
SIE argued that the CR’s alleged exclusionary abuses should collectively be characterised as an allegation of a refusal to supply, engaging the more demanding Bronner conditions. Those conditions require (i) indispensability of the requested access, (ii) a likelihood of eliminating effective competition in a neighbouring market, and (iii) the absence of objective justification. Where IP is involved, the CR accepted that a party seeking to establish refusal to supply also needed to establish that the refusal had prevented a new product from emerging or limited technical development.
Following Android Auto and Kent v Apple, an often-asked question was whether those conditions could still apply to a platform that already accommodated third parties. The CAT’s answer was that they could, depending on the specific activity and infrastructure concerned.
Allowing publishers to develop games for PlayStation, the CAT held, was not equivalent to opening SIE’s digital distribution infrastructure to rival digital stores. Unlike the platforms considered in those cases, hosting a competing storefront required material reconfiguration, not merely the admission of another app to the system. SIE had reserved the relevant distribution functionality for its own use.
The CAT applied the familiar United Brands framework: first looking at whether prices were significantly and persistently excessive by reference to an appropriate benchmark; second, whether they were unfair in themselves or by comparison with other products.
The legitimate cross-subsidy of console hardware could not be ignored when assessing digital distribution returns. Users benefited from subsidised hardware and paid for that benefit through content revenues. The appropriate focus was therefore profitability at system level, rather than digital distribution in isolation.
Comparing the Return on Capital Employed (‘ROCE’) generated at the system level in the actual versus the ROCE that Mr Harman's calculations suggested would be earned under "conditions of workable competition" produced only a marginal difference, suggesting that SIE's pricing could not be considered excessive on a Limb 1 assessment.
A full assessment was unnecessary in view of the CAT’s findings on Limb 1. Nevertheless, the CAT considered that PlayStation’s distinctive value would have presented a further obstacle to the CR. It found that SIE’s evidence showed “a business that has won the last two generational battles with rival console systems through sustained competitive effort” and that “[t]here is ample evidence that consumers recognise the quality of the [SIE] offering”.
The CR’s comparators were also weak and it was “far from clear that there was any difference between the actual price charged by [SIE] for digital PlayStation games and add-on content and the price charged by the comparators selected by Mr Harman”: PC storefront margins did not remunerate the same integrated console offering, while SIE’s platform charge on physical games did not include the retailer’s distribution function. Neither provided a like-for-like point of comparison for the PS Store margin.
The judgment is likely to have significant implications for antitrust enforcement in digital markets, in particular in other class actions before the CAT:
The case underlines the importance of considering conduct within the relevant market context, with the CAT finding that the nature of the console business model and competitive constraints faced by businesses like SIE’s (which collectively pointed to a systems market being the appropriate market definition) meant that theories of harm that had been advanced and accepted in other app store cases were not necessarily applicable in the present context.
The refusal-to-supply analysis confirms that the doctrine and the Bronner criteria remain relevant, after recent judgments including the CAT’s judgment in Kent v Apple had led to many commentators questioning if they could ever apply in digital markets. The CAT confirmed that the relevant question is not simply whether a platform serves third parties, but whether the particular infrastructure and functionality sought were developed and reserved for the operator’s own use. This finding is likely to be of particular relevance to technology businesses.
The parties called six experts between them, but SIE also called 12 factual witnesses, including witnesses from publishers. The CR did not call any fact witnesses. SIE’s fact witnesses explained both the business model and the system’s practical operation. On detailed technical questions, the CAT generally preferred the evidence of SIE’s experienced engineers to that of either independent expert on engineering matters. This underscores the value of ensuring that expert evidence is backed up by relevant factual testimony.
In a similar vein, the judgment emphasises the importance of experts engaging with the factual evidence and disclosure before them - with the CAT noting that it was unpersuaded by significant aspects of the expert evidence presented by the CR (as well as aspects of SIE's economic evidence).
The CAT also criticised the manner in which the CR's technical evidence had evolved over the course of the case, and continued to evolve during the course of trial.
The judgment marks an important moment in the development of the CAT’s collective proceedings regime. It is the first digital markets case brought under that regime in which a defendant has received a positive judgment. It is a reminder that certification is not an endorsement of a claim’s merits: once a case reaches trial, the class representative must establish each element of the alleged infringement through cogent evidence grounded in the commercial and technical realities of the business concerned.
That distinction takes on particular significance as the CAT prepares to hear a substantial number of cases raising novel and complex questions of abuse of dominance, including many in digital markets. This judgment underlines that the development of that law must be rooted in the evidence in each case, rather than assumptions about how digital platforms operate or the wholesale transposition of theories of harm from one context to another.
The judgment is available here: 1527/7/7/22 Alex Neill Class Representative Limited v Sony Interactive Entertainment Europe Limited.
Linklaters acted for SIE in these proceedings.