U.S. DOJ provides long-awaited clarity on enforcement priorities with key policy updates, with significant emphasis on self-disclosure

On May 12, 2025, Matthew R. Galeotti, the recently appointed Head of the U.S. Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) Criminal Division, announced that the DOJ is “turning a new page on white-collar and corporate enforcement,” which poses a “significant threat to U.S. interests.”

With the DOJ’s new White-Collar Enforcement Plan, the Criminal Division’s efforts will focus on “the most egregious white-collar crime to make our nation safer and more prosperous, vindicate victims’ rights, maximize the use of the Department’s resources, and provide fairness and transparency to individuals and companies alike,” guided by the principles of “focus, fairness and efficiency.” As part of this program, prosecutors will focus on “key threats to America,” which include “unchecked fraud in U.S. markets and government programs,” the “deadly activities of cartels and [transnational criminal organizations (‘TCOs’)]” that are “enabled by international money laundering organizations and other financial facilitators,” as well as “[i]Illicit financial and logistical networks” that “undermine our national security by facilitating sanctions evasion by hostile nation-states and terror regimes.”

To effect this plan, the DOJ announced three policy updates, which include changes to the DOJ’s self-disclosure policies and whistleblower program, which are aimed at enhancing and clarifying the benefits for companies that self-report, and changes to the DOJ’s monitor selection policy, which reflect the DOJ’s present view that “the value monitors add is often outweighed by the costs they impose.” We discuss the White-Collar Enforcement Plan and these policy updates in further detail below.

The DOJ’s White-Collar Enforcement Plan

In its new White-Collar Enforcement Plan, the DOJ has committed to “prioritize investigating and prosecuting corporate crimes in areas that will have the greatest impact in protecting American citizens and companies and promoting U.S. interests.”

The Plan describes the following non-exhaustive list of ten priority areas:

Key Enforcement Priorities
Fraud	Waste, fraud & abuse, including healthcare fraud / procurement fraud Trade & customs fraud, including tariff evasion Fraud through “Variable Interest Entities” (typically Chinese-affiliated companies on U.S. exchanges) Fraud that victimizes U.S. investors, individuals, and markets
Financial Crime	Bribery and associated money laundering that “impact U.S. national interests, undermine U.S. national security, harm the competitiveness of U.S. businesses, and enrich foreign corrupt officials” Complex money laundering, including through Chinese money laundering organizations or involving illicit drugs Certain crimes involving digital assets
National Security/Terrorism	Conduct that threatens U.S. national security, including threats to the U.S. financial system and sanctions violations Material support to foreign terrorist organizations
IIIicit Drugs	Violations of the Controlled Substances Act and Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, including in relation to illicit drugs

While most of these priority areas are unsurprising, the inclusion of bribery is particularly noteworthy after the U.S. government’s recent 6-month pause on FCPA enforcement. Bribery’s inclusion suggests that despite the pause, we can still expect to see enforcement of domestic and foreign bribery if such acts are deemed contrary to U.S. interests.

The Plan also includes the following highlights:

• Prosecutors are to prioritize “schemes involving senior-level personnel or other culpable actors, demonstrable loss, and efforts to obstruct justice;”

• The DOJ will review all existing corporate resolutions to determine eligibility for early-termination;

• Going forward, corporate resolutions are not to extend beyond three years in duration “except in exceedingly rare circumstances;” and

• Cases may move faster—prosecutors have been directed to “move expeditiously to investigate cases and make charging decisions.”

The DOJ is updating its self-disclosure policies to “simplify” and “clarify the outcomes that companies can expect”

As we expected, the DOJ will keep the prior administration’s policies encouraging voluntary self-disclosure in place. In fact, the DOJ will go even farther—because the policies “had gotten unwieldy and hard to navigate,” the DOJ wants its policies to be as transparent as possible about what companies can expect to receive if they come forward.

To that end, the DOJ updated the Criminal Division’s Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy (“CEP”), which ensures that, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, companies that voluntarily self-disclose, fully cooperate, and timely and appropriately remediate will receive a declination—not merely a presumption of a declination. These companies will also not be required to enter a criminal resolution, creating a “clear path to declination.”

Aggravating circumstances? Now, even companies with aggravating circumstances may be eligible for a declination, based on weighing the severity of those aggravating circumstances with the company’s cooperation and remediation.

Not first in the door? Pursuant to the new CEP, companies who in good-faith self-report after the DOJ becomes aware of the conduct or “not quickly enough” are still eligible to receive “significant benefits,” namely a non-prosecution agreement with a term of fewer than 3 years, 75% reduction of the criminal fine, and no monitor.

In other cases, where companies have met some but not all of the requirements, prosecutors maintain discretion to determine the appropriate resolution, which could still include a fine reduction of up to 50%.

Changes to whistleblower program reflect the DOJ’s “focus on the worst actors and most egregious crimes”

The DOJ also updated its Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program to reflect new priority areas for tips. In addition to the previous priority areas, which the DOJ left untouched (which notably include FCPA violations), the DOJ added violations by or through companies related to:

• Fraud against or the deception of the U.S. government in connection with federally funded contracting or federal programs (beyond health care fraud and illegal health care kickbacks, which are separately captured);

• Trade, tariff, and customs fraud;
• Federal immigration law; and
• Sanctions offenses, material support of terrorism or cartels and TCOs, including money laundering, narcotics, and Controlled Substances Act violations.

All other aspects of the program remain the same as we previously reported. 

Imposing monitors—proportionality to be the DOJ’s “top line value criterion”

According to Galeotti, the DOJ’s “unchecked” historical enforcement efforts “have come at too high a cost for businesses and American enterprise.” With regards to monitorships, Galeotti observed that:

As with unchecked enforcement, unrestrained monitors can be a burden on businesses that are frequently making self-directed improvements and investing significant amounts in their own compliance programs to solve problems internally and proactively. Without appropriate oversight from the Criminal Division, monitors can create an adversarial relationship with the companies they monitor, impose significant expense, stray from their core mission, and unduly interfere with business. At times, the money companies spend on their monitor could be better spent investing in their compliance programs or, if they haven’t already, making victims whole.

To rectify this, the DOJ has published an updated Monitor Selection Policy. According to Galeotti, with this new policy we can expect to see “fewer” monitors going forward, though they may still be appropriate in “limited circumstances,” where “a narrowly-tailored monitorship that is right-sized to the conduct it seeks to remedy.”

When deciding whether to impose a monitor, proportionality will be the DOJ’s “top line value criterion,” as “the benefits of the monitor should outweigh its costs, both monetary costs, as well as burdens on the business’ operations.”

Factors prosecutors will consider include:

• The nature and seriousness of the conduct and risk of repetition;

• The availability of alternate effective independent government oversight;

• The efficacy of a company’s compliance program and culture of compliance; and

• The maturity of a company’s controls and ability to test and update its compliance program.

To ensure costs are proportionate, the DOJ will require a fee cap, approve budgets for all workplans, and require biannual tripartite meetings between the DOJ, the monitor, and the company.

The DOJ will also review each pre-existing monitorship to narrow its scope or may terminate the monitorship altogether depending on the circumstances.

Key takeaways

Most crucially, these policy updates make clear that U.S. white-collar enforcement is alive and well. The DOJ’s policy announcements follow a recent 6-month pause on FCPA enforcement, which raised questions regarding the new administration’s white-collar enforcement priorities. The DOJ has now clarified that white-collar enforcement will continue, although it may look slightly different.

Our key takeaways are as follows:

• Bribery remains an enforcement priority: As noted above, bribery is included as a top ten enforcement priority area, which demonstrates the DOJ’s commitment to continuing enforcement of bribery and corruption—including foreign bribery and corruption. The focus on U.S. interests and U.S. national security could be a warning sign to non-U.S. companies, which we will be watching closely.

• List of top-10 priority areas is non-exhaustive: Remember that criminal offenses that are not included in the top-10 list above can still be prosecuted.

• The new administration is making a concerted effort to incentivize self-disclosure: CEP updates demonstrate the DOJ’s commitment to maintaining and strengthening Biden-era policies aimed at encouraging self-disclosure, with the goal of providing those contemplating coming forward with more certainty regarding likely outcomes. The effectiveness of these changes remains to be seen, as prosecutors presumably maintain some discretion in determining which program requirements are met. Nevertheless, the changes may shift the balance in favor of self-disclosure in certain circumstances.

• Changes to whistleblower program scope may prompt influx of tips in newly-added priority areas: We may see increased numbers of whistleblower tips as people come forward with information about unlawful conduct related to the new priority areas, which could prompt new investigations and/or prosecutions. Companies should take this time to assess their exposure in relation to the new priority areas and update their compliance programs and controls as needed to address those risks.

• Implementing effective policies for dealing with internal whistleblowers is crucial: As whistleblowers often go to the authorities after their internal complaints remain unanswered, it is imperative to have clear procedures in place to ensure complaints are reviewed by a compliance professional in a timely manner, who should consult with experienced counsel as quickly as possible to assess whether self-disclosure makes sense in the circumstances.