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Big CAT Watch

Our UK competition collective proceedings tracker

The UK Competition Appeal Tribunal (the CAT) is dealing with some enormous pieces of litigation as part of its competition collective action regime. These big claims have become the pride of the CAT and the main event in UK collective redress. But developments in collective proceedings can happen quickly and quietly and keeping track of them can feel like herding cats.

 

Big CAT Watch is our new platform containing data and analysis on UK collective proceedings. Our Big CAT Watch visualisations chew through the complexity and show you what you need to know about UK collective proceedings.

The information in this analysis is updated at the start of each month. It was last updated on 1 September 2025. The information is taken from documents published on the CAT’s website, so new applications will not be included until the CAT publishes them.

The Big CAT Watch charts below show collective proceedings applications broken down by:

  • Certification Status 
  • Opt-in / Opt-out
  • Standalone / Follow-on
  • Infringement Type
  • Industrial Sector
 

UK collective proceedings analysis

Certification Status

The collective proceedings regime allows class representatives to bring competition class actions. Proposed class representatives must apply to the CAT for permission to continue their collective proceedings. If the CAT gives permission, it certifies the proceedings by making a collective proceedings order (CPO).

The certification status chart shows the proportions of CPO applications which have been certified, refused, withdrawn, stayed, have been consolidated or are still pending. Some of the certification decisions may be subject to appeal.

Key takeaways about the certification status of applications:

Pending applications currently comprise 28% of the total number of CPO applications. Those pending applications account for:

  • 100% of applications issued in 2025
  • 45% of applications issued in 2024
  • 44% of applications issued in 2023
  • 25% of applications issued in 2022
  • none of the applications issued before 2022

Despite the low threshold it has adopted following the Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in Merricks v Mastercard, the CAT has been willing to refuse applications in certain cases. This includes:

  • The applications for CPOs against water companies, which were refused because the claims were excluded by statute.
  • The application brought in respect of an agreement between Apple and Amazon, which was refused because the class representative had not demonstrated sufficient independence or robustness so as to act fairly and adequately in the interests of the class.
  • The application on behalf of songwriter members of the Performing Rights Society Limited. This was because the Proposed Class Representative (PCR) had not advanced: (i) a coherent basis why the defendant’s conduct would have caused royalties to be lower for the class as a whole; or (ii) a plausible methodology for estimating the royalties that songwriters should have been paid. The CAT also held that the cost-benefit of the claim did not favour certification.

The two applications which have been stayed were made by PCRs who lost their carriage disputes with rival PCRs. The Tribunal stayed their applications in case it revokes the CPOs which it has now made in favour of the rival PCRs.

certification status pie chart
opt-in bar graph

Opt-in / Opt-out

The CAT may make CPOs on an opt-in or opt-out basis, or a hybrid of the two. The opt-in / opt-out chart shows CPO applications broken down on that basis.

In an opt-in CPO, class members are only included in the class if they notify the class representative. In an opt-out CPO, UK domiciled class members are automatically included unless they opt-out by a specified time.

Key takeaways about the opt-in / opt-out split:

The vast majority of applications have been made on an opt-out basis. This is because, no matter how well advertised an opt-in claim is, the numbers of class members who would opt-in cannot compete with the number who wouldn’t opt out.

Many CPO applications have class definitions which comprise millions of people, but are only seeking small amounts of compensation per person. The CAT is cognisant that millions of class members will not go to the effort of opting-in, particularly if the possible benefit is relatively small. It is also aware of the significant logistical challenges that would be involved in active participation by that number of people. Accordingly, the Tribunal has shown itself willing to certify opt-out proceedings.

However, the Tribunal has become increasingly focussed on trying to ensure that any successes in collective proceedings predominantly benefits class members rather than just the class representative and their lawyers and funders:

  • In May 2024, when certifying the power cables CPO, it expressed concern that take-up may be particularly low in a claim for small refunds on electricity bills and ordered the PCR to report on her plans for distribution to class members within three months of certification.
  • In January 2025, the CAT refused certification of a claim against Apple and Amazon because it was not convinced that the Proposed Class Representative understood her funding arrangements well enough to protect the interests of class members if they conflicted with interests of the litigation funder.
  • In June 2025 the Tribunal approved a collective settlement in Merricks v Mastercard on the basis that class members who sign up to receive a distribution will receive a varying amount depending on how many other class members sign up. The CAT said it was just and reasonable that class members receive £45 each for a 5% take-up (or proportionally lesser and greater amounts for greater and lesser levels of take-up, capped at £70 each). It rejected a submission by the litigation funder that class members should only be entitled to a pro rata distribution of the settlement amount (which would have amounted to about £4.50 each) because that approach would have led to a very low take-up. The Tribunal emphasised that the CPO regime should operate for the benefit of class members and not primarily for the benefit of lawyers and funders.

Standalone / follow-on 

CPO applications may be filed on a standalone or follow-on basis, or a hybrid of the two. The standalone / follow-on chart shows CPO applications broken down on that basis.

Follow-on claims are based on existing regulatory decisions that competition law has been infringed. In a follow-on claim, the class representative does not need to prove that the defendant has breached competition law because the infringement decision is binding on the CAT. 

By contrast, in a standalone claim the class representative does have to prove that there has been an infringement of competition law. Claims can also be made on a hybrid basis, relying on infringement decisions for part of the claim.

Key takeaways about the standalone / follow-on split: 

Traditionally, most competition claims have been brought on a follow-on basis because claimants have much less to prove if they rely on an existing regulatory decision. In fact, before 2015, it was not possible to bring standalone proceedings in the CAT (they had to be brought in the High Court instead).

The popularity of the collective proceedings regime has led to a sea change. Litigation funders and claimant lawyers have been increasingly inventive in the types of claims they have sought to bring. As well as bringing claims which follow-on from the binding decisions of UK or European competition regulators, they are (in particular) also bringing claims inspired by non-binding decisions by other regulators and public bodies. These include claims inspired by the decisions of consumer and financial regulators.

The Tribunal handed down its first trial judgment in collective proceedings in Le Patourel v BT in December 2024. In that decision, the CAT gave little weight to the provisional conclusions on BT’s pricing which had previously been reached by its regulator Ofcom. Whilst this decision is likely to discourage claimants from over reliance on regulatory findings, it is unlikely to prevent them from basing competition claims on regulatory decisions on the basis that there is no smoke without fire.

Standalone bar graph
Infringement type bar graph

Infringement Type

There are two competition law causes of action which damages claims can be based on: restriction of competition and abuse of dominance. The infringement type chart shows CPO applications broken down on that basis.

Restriction of competition claims are based on section 2 Competition Act 1998, which provides that a defendant has infringed competition law if they were involved in an agreement, decision by an association or concerted practice which may have affected trade within the UK and had as its object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the UK.

Abuse of dominance claims are based on section 18 of that Act, which provides that a defendant has infringed competition law if they engaged in conduct which amounted to the abuse of a dominant position in a market which may have affected trade in the UK.

These prohibitions are based on Article 101 and Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Collective proceedings can still be brought for infringements of EU law provisions where those infringements took place before 31 December 2020.

Key takeaways about the infringement type breakdown:

Infringement type is closely connected with the standalone / follow-on trends (discussed above):

  • In total, 38 applications have been made for CPOs in abuse of dominance claims. 34 of these were brought on a standalone basis.
  • The 24 restriction of competition claims are more mixed: 10 are standalone claims, 9 are follow-on claims, and 5 claims include follow-on and standalone elements.

The strong connection between abuse of dominance and standalone claims exists because one of the ways that claimant lawyers and funders have brought inventive standalone claims is by identifying companies who can be alleged to have dominant positions in particular markets and that appear to have engaged in conduct that has negatively affected consumers. Claims built on this type of conduct will allege that the behaviours are abuses of dominant positions in the relevant markets.

By contrast, there is a strong connection between regulatory decisions and restriction of competition claims. In addition to the 14 restriction of competition claims which have a formal follow-on element, 9 out of the 10 standalone restriction of competition applications claims are quasi-follow-on (in the sense that they are inspired by regulatory investigations or decisions which are not binding in the proceedings):

  • The 3 car finance CPO applications were inspired by a ban on discretionary commission arrangements by the Financial Conduct Authority.
  • The 4 interchange fee CPOs are seeking to rely on European Commission decisions about other types of interchange fees.
  • The application for a CPO (which has now been refused) in respect of an agreement between Apple and Amazon was inspired by the decision of the Italian competition authority.
  • The farmed Atlantic salmon CPO application was inspired by a European Commission investigation into salmon producers.

Industrial Sector

The industrial sector chart shows CPO applications broken down by the industrial sector that the claim primarily relates to.

Key takeaways about the industrial sector breakdown:

The group of novel claims which are being brought on the basis of alleged abuses of dominant positions have disproportionately been targeted at tech companies.      

The prevalence of CPO applications in the consumer sector reflects the incentives for class sizes to be as large as possible (mentioned in the context of the opt-in / opt-out statistics). For example:

  • The farmed Atlantic salmon claim is being brought on behalf of everyone who purchased the product for personal consumption (estimated to be 36-44 million people, entitled to £2 to £10 each).
  • The (rejected) application for a CPO in respect of an agreement between Apple and Amazon had an estimated class size of 36 million people who purchased at least one retail Apple product.

It is unsurprising that there have been a large number of finance CPO applications because financial service providers are a traditional target for litigation funders and claimant law firms. The financial sector CPO applications are varied and include claims about forex trading, interchange fees on card transactions and car finance brokerage commission.

Industrial sector bar graph

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